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Abstract 
Awareness and compliance, triggering the export authorisations’ process, are the primary elements of an effective export 
control system, which otherwise could not be based solely on enforcement at borders and prosecution. 
ICP is a challenge further complicated by evolving regulations, globalisation, geopolitical issues and trade patterns. 
A first note with overview of ICP issues and a general model, with a long list of references was published by JRC in 2013. 
This second version has been commented and improved by the ESARDA Export Control Working Group in 2014. 
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Introduction 
Strategic export control
1
 is one of the pillars of nuclear non-proliferation, and complements both the 
international safeguards and physical protection regimes. It monitors and controls international transfers of 
nuclear and non-nuclear materials, technology and equipment. Since the end of WWII, the State-level 
proliferation in the 60’s and 70’s, and the advent of transnational illicit procurement networks in the 90’s and 
early 2000s, the awareness of WMD proliferation risks has grown.  
 
Non-proliferation measures no longer focus solely on the State but has been broadened to a trans- (and sub-) 
national dimension, addressing proliferation networks, terrorists and other non-state actors. 
 
These challenging circumstances triggered the development of the export control regimes (Zangger Committee, 
Nuclear Suppliers Group, Australia Group, Missile Technology Control Regime and Wassenaar Arrangement), 
EU regulations and national laws. There is an increasing acknowledgement that exporters also have an 
important role to play in ensuring compliance with export controls. Without access to supplies from high-tech 
companies and technology holders in particular, the development of WMD and delivery means by countries of 
concern and proliferation networks would be much harder, if not impossible. Exporters are therefore the first 
line of defence against illicit procurement attempts. 
 
The reform of the EU legal framework in 2009 (Regulation (EC) 428/2009, hereinafter called DU regulation) 
placed an increased emphasis on the responsibility of the exporter. For instance, the catch-all provision in 
article 4 of the DU Regulation not only require a licence for non-listed items if the exporter has been informed 
by his national authority, but also if the exporter is aware or has grounds for suspecting that the items will be 
used for WMD proliferation purposes.  
 
Despite the Single Market, the DU regulation still includes an authorisation process for intra-EU transfers of a 
range of sensitive items. Brokering and transit are included to fulfil obligations placed on States by United 
Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540. The Regulation also addresses Intangible Technology 
Transfers (ITT), an increasing proliferation vulnerability (through e-mails, training, invited talks and the latest 
development, cloud computing). ITT constitutes a major challenge to enforcement of controls as it effects not 
only industry but research organisations and universities when working across geographic boarders.  
 
A careful examination of the provisions of the DU regulation reveals that there is no concrete obligation on 
industry and research centres to develop Internal Compliance Programmes or other compliance mechanisms. 
The only compliance mechanism is set out in article 20 and concerns a requirement for exporters and brokers 
of dual-use items to keep detailed registers or records of their exports, in accordance with their respective 
national law or practice.  
 
Contrary to the DU regulation, the Council’s “New Lines for Action in combating the proliferation of WMD and 
their deliveries” provides for the adoption of awareness raising models for undertakings, scientific/academic 
circles and financial institutions
2
.   
 
The international export control regimes are based on politically binding, as opposed to legally binding, 
agreements. Only the Wassenaar Arrangement has done any work on codifying ICPs. UNSCR 1540, which is 
legally-binding on States, calls on them to implement an efficient export control systems to prevent illicit 
trafficking. In this respect it is clear that only States whose exporters comply with the DU export control 
regulatory framework can contribute to such a challenging effort. Those who do not comply - out of lack of 
information, negligence, or malevolent attitude – greatly reduce its efficiency.  
 
                                                                
1
 By export control we mean the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items. By 
exporter we mean the one who is doing one of these activities. For the fluency of the paper, we choose to use 
“export control” and “exporter” as collective nouns. 
2
 Council of EU - General Secretariat, New Lines for Action by the European Union in Combating the 
proliferation of WMD and their Delivery systems, 17172/08, Brussels 17 Dec. 2008. Retrieved from: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/december/tradoc_141740.pdf   
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Awareness and compliance, triggering the export authorisation process in circumstances where this is required, 
are the primary elements of an effective export control system. The system cannot be effective if it relies 
solely on enforcement action, fines and imprisonment. 
 
Internal Compliance Programmes 
Internal Compliance Programs (ICPs) promote awareness raising and the fulfilment of export control 
requirements by exporters (e.g. the supply chain, systems integrators, distributors and others such as research 
centres).   
 
They can also enhance communication and cooperation between the State and the exporter (ISIS, 2003:2). In 
France, for example, the ICP is the first personal link between the authorities and industry (Paile, 2011:70). The 
ICP assists the exporter to manage the exports of dual-use goods and technologies and to meet the export 
control requirements of their national system. 
 
A properly implemented ICP provides an organisation exporting sensitive items and technologies with a 
structured approach, and supports a culture of doing business in ways that ensure delivery of items to 
legitimate end-users thus minimizing the risk of diversion.  
 
ICPs require an exporter to introduce clear policies and procedures that will be easily understood by staff, thus 
reducing the likelihood of mistakes. The shipment of any dual-use equipment without due authorisation, even 
if this is to a non-sensitive customer, may have adverse consequences for both international security and the 
exporter’s business and its employees (e.g. contribution to illicit procurement and proliferating activities of 
end-users; withdrawal of a company’s exporting privileges; other administrative penalties, fines and 
imprisonment). 
  
According to the Guidelines of the Wassenaar Arrangement (2011:1) an ICP is not legally binding but 
recommended. It is the duty of the State to encourage, where appropriate, its exporters to develop and 
implement ICPs. It may assist by providing expertise and guidance material on ICPs in any relevant form, 
including seminars and the opportunity to audit the draft ICP. The State may also consider measures and 
stimuli in domestic laws and regulations encouraging exporters to introduce an ICP. ISIS (2003) points the 
government’s role in developing policies to better regulate export controls and create an environment 
supportive of non-proliferation efforts. The implementation of an ICP is the responsibility of both the State and 
the exporter. 
 
There is no consensus amongst EU Member States on the need to impose an ICP obligation on exporters. 
According to art.12.2 of the DU Regulation the national authority, when assessing an application for a global 
authorisation, shall take into consideration the compliance of the exporter with the provisions and objectives 
of this Regulation and with the terms and conditions of the authorisation. Some Member States (Finland and 
Romania) interpret art.12.2 as requiring an exporter to have an ICP in place before they will issue a global 
authorisation (Article 23 Coordination Group, 2011: question 1). Other Member States (Estonia, Poland and 
UK) challenge this interpretation. According to these Member States, the fact that the exporter must have 
proportionate and adequate means to ensure compliance with the DU Regulation does not require 
implementation of a formalised ICP. 
 
COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION (2011/24/EU) of 11 January 2011 on the certification of defence 
undertakings under the EU Directive on intra-community transfer of defence related products contains criteria 
for assessing whether a company qualifies for certification. These criteria are essentially guiding governments 
on evaluation of ICPs or their equivalents.  
 
In some countries outside the EU implementation of an ICP is viewed as proof that an exporter takes his export 
compliance responsibilities seriously. For example in Japan, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 
(METI) publishes on its website the names of those companies that have registered their ICPs and agreed for 
this information to be made public (METI, 2007).  Companies do this because they see it as a way of 
demonstrating to the public that they are a company of good standing. 
These various interpretations show that a further analysis would be useful. 
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Types of exporters 
Is the exporter a manufacturer or an academic institute? Does it perform commercial activities or research? 
Exporters can be:-  
 Nuclear operators 
 Nuclear technology holders 
 Design and consulting services 
 Manufacturers of dual-use goods 
 research centres 
 universities,  
 system integrators  
 suppliers 
 distributors 
 brokers 
 governmental and international organisations, e.g. for cooperation and assistance 
 
 
Issues  
 
The type of business/activity and organisation/geographic location will determine the nature of the 
compliance programme to be implemented.  
 
For instance, a company with subsidiaries in 3
rd
 countries will have to comply with the export control laws and 
regulations of every country where they operate.  This may include ensuring that the re-export restrictions 
placed on an item by one country are adhered to when it is exported from another.  It may also involve 
imports and exports associated with internal processing with its branches located abroad. This applies equally 
to the transfer of technology, as well as parts and components, and possibly may require authorisation for 
movements between EU Member States.
3
 
 
Industry and research organisations will find themselves needing to consider whether their work is subject to  
intangible technology transfer controls (ITT) if they are co-operating with anyone in a 3
rd
 country (ref. EXP-WG 
presentations). 
 
Exporters of goods and services will also need to ensure that they comply with technical assistance controls 
when providing such a service. 
 
In conducting their research, scientists often need to exchange information and results with colleagues all over 
the world. International joint projects may also deal with controlled technology and multi-national regulatory 
frameworks. In this context, it is not always clear when information can be considered part of the “public 
domain” or is considered to be “basic scientific research” both of which are not controlled.  The Horizon 2020 
Human Security Research Toolkit will provide guidance to project proposers. 
 
No one size fits all approach 
Each exporter has to tailor its ICP to its own characteristics (e.g. size, nature of items exported, national, 
regional or global footprint).   
 
Several ICP models, guidelines and examples are available from open sources. However, they have to be 
tailored to the organisation. There is no one size fits all approach.   
 
Small companies may not need an Export Control Unit or an export control officer in each business unit (as can 
be the case in larger companies). The export control responsibility may be able to be managed by one person, 
                                                                
3
 Intra-EU transfers apply to items include in Annex IV of EU dual-use regulation 
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possibly along with other tasks. In universities and research centres, an Export Control Unit would not be 
necessary if the number of controlled exports was limited. Such companies and institutions would probably 
also lack the resources to afford to pay for an external audit. In such cases the task could fall to the person in 
charge of export controls. National authorities may provide assistance and guidance on ICPs and audits that 
may be of help. 
 
Some states
4
 expect a more developed ICP in large organisations with extensive exports (Article 23 
Coordination Group, 2011: question 3). Beside the size, the volume of controlled items transacted is relevant. 
A large organisation with very few controlled exports will need to devote less time and resources to 
implementing an ICP than a small or medium size organisation where all items appear on the control list.  
 
It is widely recognised that establishing an ICP carries costs (SEESAC 2011:8). An organisation will need to 
allocate resources (time, financial and human). However an effective compliance programme offers many 
advantages. Efficient implementation of export control compliance will ensure that they are not an 
impediment to business. Compliance can be used as a positive differentiator in bids and a compliant company 
will be able to respond to customers faster because they understand the export control regime they are 
working in. Regulators may grant compliant companies’ access to licences not available to competitors if they 
have an ICP. Compliance will help business avoid negative and damaging publicity, costly fines and prison for 
employees and senior management.  
 
Once an ICP has been introduced, work is not finished. An ICP is a living document. It needs to be updated to 
take account of changes in national laws and regulations, to changes in organisation, structure and business 
model and reviewed regularly after audits. 
 
The end-use and sensitivity of items is key to deciding whether an ICP is needed. Even if no goods, software or 
technology  appear on the control list export controls may still apply if the exporter is aware, has been 
informed by government or has grounds to suspect that they may contribute to proliferation activities.  
 
 
The U.S. Department of Commerce (2011:3) provides in its guidelines a list of variables that influence an ICP:  
 
a) Size of the organisation; 
b) End-use and sensitivity of products; 
c) Geographic location of business and customers; 
d) Relationship with business partners; 
e) Volume of exports; 
f) Products restrictions; 
g) Complexity of internal export processes. 
Looking at these variables it is useful to draft a risk-profile of the organisation, identifying ICP issues, as e.g. 
indicated by The Metropolitan Corporate Counsel (2007): 
 
a) Identify relevant business activities; 
b) Examine potential risk areas in its client base; 
c) Identify products or services that the company offers that may attract sanctioned countries; 
d) Examine its marketing practices; 
e) Assess the risk-sensitivity of the company. 
ICP Basic Elements 
A comprehensive analysis of the key elements of an ICP is a preliminary step to understanding how to 
implement an ICP. Though each organisation must undergo the same underlying analysis to identify risk areas, 
the actual elements of the final ICP will vary greatly from company to company. ICPs should contain a variant 
                                                                
4
Ireland, Hungary, Sweden and UK. 
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of the elements listed below. Each organisation should determine which procedures to apply for each element 
to ensure the most effective and efficient ICP to suit its purposes (Rubinoff & Soliman, 2007). It is important 
that the ICP is an integrated programme. Each element of an ICP should build upon, and interconnect, with all 
other parts of the programme (U.S. Department of commerce, 2011:7). 
See also "Leybold charter" 
 
A general model of an ICP is set out below. 
 
1. Commitment to compliance 
The compliance statement, written by a senior representative, contains the exporter’s awareness of and 
compliance with all domestic export control laws and regulations (and foreign laws and regulations where 
appropriate). The Senior Management’s commitment to compliance underlines the importance of the ICP in 
the organisation and raises awareness within the company. It also establishes a culture of compliance. The 
commitment to compliance can also be referred in the corporate mission statement. 
The “Compliance Code of Practice” of BIS (2010:13) gives an example of the commitment to compliance issued 
by senior management (see Annex 1). 
 
Key elements of the Commitment to 
compliance 
Senior representative 
 
2. Written Export Management & Compliance Programme 
An ICP requires the development of an Export Management & Compliance Programme to communicate 
management commitment to the ICP and to outline the basic guiding principles. A written Export Management 
& Compliance Programme is a tool for employees, a “map of compliance” to follow. It is important that it 
reaches all employees. Apart from employees directly concerned with the exporting process, others involved 
in such areas as design, development, engineering, research, purchasing, the supply chain, maintenance and 
after sales service must be made aware particularly as many of them will potentially be exporters of 
technology via email and other electronic means. It is also critical to ensure that the IT department’s strategy 
takes account of and is fully compliant with intangible technology controls. 
   
The programme should include a statement of commitment to compliance written by a senior representative, 
the basis of the compliance training programme, the compliance policies and step-by-step procedures, the 
point-of-contact (the person responsible for export control) and the disciplinary measures in case of violation 
of the export control laws and regulations. It should be as short and simple as possible, illustrated with visual 
aids (matrices, flowcharts and checklist) (M.E. Dey & Co, s.d.). 
 
Key elements of the written Export 
Management and Compliance Program 
Written statement by senior representative 
Training program 
Compliance policies 
Step-by-step procedures 
Point-of-contact 
Disciplinary measures in case of violations 
 
3. Responsibility 
The organisation needs to appoint a person responsible for overall compliance with export controls. The 
person charged with this responsibility needs to be a senior representative (director or other individual of 
corresponding status) because he has to carry personal responsibility for export control compliance within the 
 8 
 
organisation. Below that person an export control manager (and deputies where the size of the organisation 
requires it) would be tasked with day to day operation of the compliance regime within the organisation.  That 
person should not be part of the sales department or any other export oriented unit to avoid conflicts of 
interest. His source of salary and evaluations should be separated from the businesses that he monitors (U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, 2011:49). That person would be responsible for 
applying for export authorisations and would also need the authority to stop a delivery if there were doubts 
about its compliance with export controls. He acts as the internal (for his colleagues) and external (towards the 
national administration) first point of contact. A backup
5
 would be required to cover for absences and any gaps 
should the export control manager leave to join another organisation or retire.  
 
Based on the Best Practice Guidelines on Internal Compliance Programmes for Dual-Use Goods and 
Technologies agreed by the Wassenaar Arrangement at the 2011 Plenary the export control manager would be 
responsible for: 
f) Development and update of the ICP; 
g) Development and revision of operational procedures; 
h) Staying-up-to-date with changes to relevant regulations and with any directions or guidance issued by 
the competent authorities; 
i) Classification/identification, screening and approval of business transactions; 
j) General export control management, throughout the business, including direction and 
communication; 
k) Assignment of personnel in charge of auditing; 
l) Training. 
Another duty sometimes assigned involves the development of procedures for cooperating with the state’s 
administration, as is required by the Polish government (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland, s.d.). 
 
Key elements of responsibility 
Independent 
Bear the appropriate responsibility 
Define the duties 
 
4. Export screening procedures 
Export screening procedures are the core of an ICP. There are a number of checks that need to be made as 
described below. Screening should take place when an order is received and prior to shipping the product in 
the event there has been a change to the control lists during the processing time (U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, 2011:93).  A similar screening of all parties to the contract also 
needs to take place to ensure that they have not been placed on a denied parties list. 
 
a) Classification/identification procedure 
This step is at the very heart of the process.  It is necessary to determine whether items to be supplied are 
subject to any restrictions on their export. The properties of the items must be evaluated against the relevant 
control list to determine whether an authorization is required.  In most organizations those responsible for the 
technology (e.g. engineering) would be responsible for undertaking the classification exercise which would be 
validated by the export control manager.  Where necessary, competent authorities should be consulted to 
agree a product rating. A record of all ratings for products, parts and components, software and technology 
should be kept to prevent needless repetition every time an order is received for the same item. However the 
record needs to be regularly reviewed to ensure that it takes into account changes to control list entries as 
these lists are subject to change.   
 
                                                                
5
 There should be at least two people able to carry this responsibility in case of holidays, illness etc. 
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Product classification can be time consuming and expensive depending on the product portfolio and number 
of items that need to be rated. 
 
The exporter needs to cross check their products against the control lists contained in applicable national laws, 
e.g. for the “EU dual-use control list” (Annex I to the DU Regulation, recently amended as Regulation 
388/2012), used also in other countries, possible additional national lists; other applicable lists in non-EU 
countries; sanctions control lists (e.g. targeting Iran, DPRK); EU Common Military List; other regulations e.g. 
the EU anti-torture regulation. Another mandatory step required In parallel
6
  is to attribute a Harmonised 
System code needed to define the appropriate customs duties (quoted from discussions at “Global Trade 
Compliance and Export Control for the Oil & Gas Industry”, London, 2013). 
 
The difficulty of the task is recognised by some States. In the Request for a Comprehensive Review of Japan’s 
Security Export Control Legal System (2010:17), it is proposed that the government supports the classification 
process by providing necessary services to exporters
7
. 
 
b) End-use screening 
The purpose of the transaction and the plausibility of the end-use stated by the client needs to be evaluated.  
The annex to the “Statement of Understanding on Implementation of End-Use Controls for Dual-Use Items” 
agreed by the Wassenaar Arrangement (2007) provides basic and additional elements that can be applied. The 
establishment of an ICP is regarded as a basic element. End-use needs to be considered in the run-up to the 
submission of an export licence application. The exporter needs to present a factually complete licence 
application, including all necessary supporting documentation. 
 
c) Customer/end-user screening 
The exporter needs to asses if the customer is the end user, and if the activities of the customer/end-user are 
relevant to the exported item.  
 
The exporter also needs to ascertain whether the destination of the item and all parties to the transaction are 
subject to any restrictions. In this respect, the U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security has developed a “Denied 
Persons List”. This list helps companies to recognize potential violators of export laws and other parties who 
are known to have previously engaged in illicit procurement behaviour. This list is posted on their website (U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 2011:9). Other countries refer to the UNSCR database containing lists of names of 
individuals and companies who are known to be associated with illicit procurement efforts, which are widely 
available. The EU includes lists of entities and individuals in Regulations containing measures targeting certain 
countries (e.g. Iran, DPRK) or terrorist activities. 
 
The Wassenaar Arrangement (2003) published a non-exhaustive list of questions (“red flags”) guiding 
companies when suspicion should be raised and contact with national export licensing authorities might be 
advisable (see Annex 2). 
 
d) Checking for catch-all requirements  
For items that do not appear on a control list this stage allows checking to see whether the competent 
authorities may require a license for the export of a non-listed item. Non-listed items may be subject to a 
‘catch-all’ if the exporter is aware, informed or has ground to suspect that they may contribute to a 
proliferating activity.  
The qualifying cases invoking such a requirement are: items with potential WMD end-uses; items with a 
possible military end-use if exported to an embargoed destination; items which are intended to be used as 
parts or components of listed military items that have been exported without authorisation. When any 
question arises, the competent national authority should be consulted.  
                                                                
6
 A Correlation table between Dual Use and Combined Nomenclature codes is available on TARIC’s web-site managed by 
DG TAXUD 
7
 For this reason, Japan industries have set up CISTEC 
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All transaction screening procedures help to prevent the diversion of the export/transfer to an unauthorised 
end-user or end-uses. 
 
AREVA (2012) formulates several guiding questions for the screening procedure: 
 What is my item? 
 Where is it going? 
 Who will receive it (consignee)? 
 Who will be the end user 
 What will be the end-use? 
 What else does the end-user do? 
 
General Electric (2012:5) defines the same questions as the four W’s of export control compliance (What, 
Where, Who and Why). 
 
Key elements of screening procedures 
Classification/identification procedure 
End-use screening 
Customer/end-user screening 
Information by the competent authorities 
 
5. Shipment control 
 
Before shipment, the classification/identification and transaction screening procedures must be completed. 
This stage verifies that those tasks have been completed. It is also there to ensure that the declaration on 
export instruction documents and/or export licences for the goods and/or technology is correct and that 
quantities to be exported are permitted by the license.  
 
Key elements of Shipment Control 
Confirmation of the classification/identification and transaction screenings 
Confirmation of the declarations 
 
6. Performance review or compliance check 
 
As already mentioned an ICP is not a static document and should be reviewed regularly. To do this, the 
exporter will need to establish a performance review process. This review will examine whether the export 
control operation has been implemented in accordance with the policies, processes and procedures set out in 
the ICP and that these are in conformance with all relevant laws and regulations. This review should be carried 
out annually. It can be performed internally or by an external body. 
 
Appropriate key performance indicators should be developed to establish the robustness of the export control 
system.  
 
Key elements of Performance review 
Export control in compliance with the ICP and its operational procedures 
Export control in compliance with all relevant laws and regulations 
Annually 
 
BIS (2010:29) provides in annex 6 of its Compliance Code of Practice a checklist for audits of internal 
compliance procedures. A list is also reported in the intra-EU arms directive (Annex 5). 
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7. Training 
 
Staff training is important to maintain a successful ICP.  Apart from employees directly concerned with the 
exporting process, others involved in such areas as design, development, engineering, purchasing, the supply 
chain, provision of IT, maintenance and after sales service must be trained.  
This includes personnel who can export technology via electronic means (ITT) and those involved in arranging 
the movement of goods to third countries (BIS, 2010:9). They all need to be made aware of relevant export 
control laws, regulations, policies, control lists and amendments as soon as they have been published. 
According to ISIS (2003:10), employees should not only learn about specific export regulations they should be 
made aware of the capabilities of the products the company exports, ways in which such products can be 
misused, and how to identify illicit procurement attempts.  
Before training is provided, the exporter needs to assess the current training programme and training needs. 
Based on these results a training plan can be developed (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2011:36). 
Participation in external events should be encouraged and special training should be provided for new 
employees. It is recommended that companies should investigate what assistance the national authority 
provides on this subject. For example, the Polish government provides an annual training fund for companies 
to use (SEESAC, 2011:29).  
 
As part of the ICP process it is important to document attendance at training programmes and courses 
completed. 
 
Key elements of Training 
Continuous training 
External training 
Training for newcomers 
 
8. Record keeping 
 
National export control regulations require that records of exports and related documentation are retained for 
a specified period.  According to Guidelines from the Wassenaar Arrangement (2011:7) these documents may 
include export licences, end-use statements, end user certificates, commercial invoices, clearance documents, 
product classification/identification sheets and records of electronic transfers.  
The exporter should establish a policy on the time, mode and place for maintaining and storing records so that 
they can be easily retrieved (BIS, 2010:11). 
 
Key elements of Record 
keeping 
National legislation 
 
9. Reporting and corrective action 
 
An ICP needs to include policies and procedures on reporting and corrective action when a violation of export 
controls has been identified. When a violation, or suspected violation, of export control regulations or ICP 
procedures occurs, a prompt report should be made to the person responsible for export controls. Confirmed 
violations of regulations should be reported without delay to the competent authority as a voluntary 
disclosure.  
 
An ICP should encourage employees to report violations without the fear of consequence.  
 
Procurement requests turned down because of suspicions that they are illicit attempts to gain products or 
technology should be reported to the relevant authorities. For nuclear related cases the IAEAs Procurement 
Outreach Programme collects such information from contributing States. 
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In exceptional circumstances where a member, or members, of staff have colluded to deliberately circumvent 
export controls disciplinary procedures should be implemented.   
 
Where infringements were caused by human error or a lack of awareness follow-up would form part of any 
corrective action deemed necessary. Any corrective action should be implemented to ensure similar violations 
will be avoided. (Guidelines of the Wassenaar Arrangement, 2011:7). 
 
 
Key elements of Reporting and Corrective Actions 
Report to the responsible person  
Report to the competent authority 
Disciplinary procedure 
Corrective action 
 
10. Communication 
 
At all times, and in ways defined by each organisation, proper and timely communication is a crucial element 
for a successful and efficient ICP.  
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Conclusions 
The basic or key elements of an ICP were discussed in this essay. Introducing an ICP in an organisation can 
mean big changes (to working methods, to responsibilities and for teams). Often change will meet with 
resistance.  
 
A transparent and persuasive communication can temper this resistance. For an ICP to be successful it needs 
the support of the whole organisation and become embedded in its culture.  
 
Maintaining an ICP is a challenge further complicated by evolving regulations, globalisation, geopolitical issues 
and trade patterns. 
 
A follow up to this note will attempt to address specific exporters, such as those involved in research, as well 
as ITT and related threats to the control of technology transfer. These merit specific attention because of the 
possible consequences of unintended transfer without proper authorisation.  This document will examine the 
issues and remedial measures that need to be implemented to preserve legitimate trade and exchange of 
information. 
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Annexes 
Annex 1: Example Commitment to Compliance 
A MESSAGE FROM THE CHAIRMAN  
“The success of this company depends in large part on the business we do overseas.  
Export controls imposed by the UK Government and the European Community affect a high proportion of the 
products we see and many of our overseas markets. We must therefore understand the controls and be quite 
sure we comply with them. The purpose of these controls is to limit the supply of technology or strategic goods 
to countries proscribed, principally for reasons of proliferation, security, or terrorism. It is in the interest of us all 
that the controls are effective if it makes the world a safer place. For our business it is essential that we comply 
with the legislation: failure to do so would bring serious penalties for the company and for the individuals 
concerned.  
I have nominated .............. to be the person with overall responsibility within the company for export control 
matters assisted by …… and he/she will be reviewing the effectiveness of our current procedures in light of the 
Export Control Organisation’s Code of Practice to which we shall adhere. But each of us must be aware of our 
own role and ensure that no items are despatched (remembering that this term also covers the transmission of 
software or technology by fax, telephone or other electronic media and arranging to move goods between third 
countries) without due clearance and authorisation. Information is available on how export controls affect your 
position; make sure you are aware of it.” 
Source: BIS, (2010). ‘Compliance Code of Practice. Annex I’, p .13. 
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Annex 2: Red Flags 
The Wassenaar Arrangement (2003) published a non-exhaustive list of questions guiding companies when 
suspicion should be raised and contact with national export licensing authorities might be advisable. 
 
1. Do you know your customer? If not, is it difficult to find information about him/her? 
2. Is the customer or the end-user tied to the military or the defence industry? 
3. Is the customer or the end-user tied to any military or governmental research body? 
4. If you have done business with the customer before - is this a usual request for them to make? Does 
the product fit the business profile? 
5. Does the customer seem familiar with the product and its performance characteristics or is there an 
obvious lack of technical knowledge? 
6. Is the customer reluctant to provide an end-use statement or is the information insufficient compared 
to other negotiations? 
7. Does the customer reject the customary installation, training or maintenance services provided? 
8. Is unusual packaging and labelling required? 
9. Is the shipping route unusual? 
10. Does the customer order an excessive amount of spare parts or other items that are related to the 
product, but not to the stated end-use? 
11. Is the customer offering unusually profitable payment terms, such as a much higher price? 
12. Is the customer offering to pay in cash? 
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Annex 3: Checklist for internal compliance 
Personnel  
 Are records of personnel involved in export control up to date?  
 Have all employees who have the ability to make exports (remember that everyone with access 
to email, telephone and fax can potentially export technology) received the necessary induction 
or (re)training?  
Documents available  
Do staff who need to have access to:  
 compliance procedures  
 up to date legislation  
 guidance notes/contact details?  
Product/licence  
 If there is a full product/country/licence matrix or similar, is it up to date?  
 Was it checked against export control legislation and current company product range within 
the last three months? - if not a check/update should be arranged within the next two months.  
 Are ratings of products up to date, including ratings in relation to new products or new 
markets?  
 Have there been any changes to Open General Licences in the last few months, which means the 
goods/destinations, are no longer covered?  
Customer information  
 Is the necessary information reaching those responsible for licence processing, for example to 
ensure quick answers to end-use enquiries? - if not, should sales/marketing staff be reminded 
of what is needed?  
 Should customers be alerted to the possible need for end-use information at an earlier stage 
(e.g. on quotation documents)?  
 Is credit control information on customers’ status being fed through for export control checks?  
Licence processing  
 Are licences held by the business up to date (for example, any changes in name or address duly 
notified)? Do the Open Individual Licences the company has have at least 6 months before they 
expire? If not has a new licence been applied for? If less than 3 months, has an extension been 
requested?  
 Are end-use undertakings valid? Are they in the right format?  
 Where individual licences are needed, is the procedure for applications working smoothly (and 
see Customer Information above)?  
 If Open General Licences are used, has the business registered with ECO? Is the licence quoted 
correctly on the relevant documentation?  
Exporting goods  
 Are instructions to despatch department and/or freight forwarders up to date?  
 Are they being adhered to (e.g. copies of export documentation returned within reasonable 
time)? - if not revise or restate the requirements and set a date to check on improvement.  
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Record keeping  
 Selecting two or three cases at random, are the records (required to be kept under the licences) 
accessible?  
 Are all related documents filed together or accessible through common fields?  
Resolution of problems  
 If aspects of procedures have been found unsatisfactory in the course of this check, or if 
problems have been encountered in operating the procedures, is there a plan for 
improvements?  
 Have the necessary revisions or amendments been made known to the relevant personnel?  
Source: BIS, (2010). ‘Compliance Code of Practice. Annex 6’, p.29. 
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Annex 4: Flowchart ICP – Step by step 
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Annex 5: Criteria referred to in Art. 9 of DIRECTIVE 2009/43/EC OF THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 6 May 2009 
simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related 
products within the Community 
 
Reliability shall be assessed according to the following criteria:  
 
(a) proven experience in defence activities, taking into account in particular the undertaking’s record of 
compliance with export restrictions, any court decisions on this matter, any authorisation to produce 
or commercialise defence-related products and the employment of experienced management staff; 
 
(b) relevant industrial activity in defence-related products within the Community, in particular capacity for 
system/sub-system integration;  
 
(c) the appointment of a senior executive as the dedicated officer personally responsible for transfers and 
exports;  
 
(d) a written commitment of the undertaking, signed by the senior executive referred to in point (c), that 
the undertaking will take all necessary steps to observe and enforce all specific conditions related to 
the end-use and export of any specific component or product received; 
 
(e) a written commitment of the undertaking, signed by the senior executive referred to in point (c), to 
provide to the competent authorities, with due diligence, detailed information in response to requests 
and inquiries concerning the end-users or end-use of all products exported, transferred or received 
under a transfer licence from another Member State; and 
 
(f) a description, countersigned by the senior executive referred to in point (c), of the internal compliance 
programme or transfer and export management system implemented in the undertaking. This 
description shall provide details of the organisational, human and technical resources allocated to the 
management of transfers and exports, the chain of responsibility within the undertaking, internal 
audit procedures, awareness-raising and staff training, physical and technical security arrangements, 
record-keeping and traceability of transfers and exports. 
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Annex 6: Export Screening Procedures 
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Item 
WHY? 
End-use 
WHO? 
End-user 
WHERE? 
Destination 
Is an export licence required?  
Are there proliferation concerns associated with this item? 
Has the exporter dealt with the end-user on many occasions in the 
past? 
Is the end-user involved in any military or chemical, nuclear or 
biological weapons proliferation activities? 
Has the end-user been screened? Have the existence and activities of 
the end-user been confirmed? 
Is there anything about the transaction that raises a “red flag”? 
Does the end-user appear on a denial list? 
Is there a possibility that the item being exported will be used in a 
military application or for chemical, nuclear or biological weapons 
proliferation? 
Can an end-use certificate been 
provided? 
Is there a risk that the end-user 
will transfer the item to another 
person? 
Is the stated end-use consistent 
with the activities of the end-
user? 
Is the item appropriate for the 
stated end-use? 
Are the final destination and transit/transhipment destination taken 
into account? 
Is the destination of the export a country of concern? Is an export 
licence required? 
Is the destination country a strategic ally or an adherent to a 
multilateral export control regime? 
Is the destination of the export a country subject to unilateral or 
multilateral sanctions? 
Does the destination country have its own export control laws and 
regulations? 
Europe Direct is a service to help you find answers to your questions about the European Union 
Freephone number (*): 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 
(*) Certain mobile telephone operators do not allow access to 00 800 numbers or these calls may be billed. 
A great deal of additional information on the European Union is available on the Internet. 
It can be accessed through the Europa server http://europa.eu. 
How to obtain EU publications 
Our publications are available from EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu), 
where you can place an order with the sales agent of your choice. 
The Publications Office has a worldwide network of sales agents. 
You can obtain their contact details by sending a fax to (352) 29 29-42758. 
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